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Abstract: 
Surveillance cameras, which is a form of Cyber Physical 
System, are deployed extensively to provide visual surveillance 
monitoring of activities of interest or anomalies. However, these 
cameras are at risks of physical security attacks against their 
physical attributes or configuration like tampering of their 
recording coverage, camera positions or recording configurations 
like focus and zoom factors. Such adversarial alteration of  
physical configuration could also be invoked through cyber 
security attacks against the camera’s software vulnerabilities to 
administratively change the camera’s physical configuration 
settings. When such Cyber Physical attacks occur, they affect the 
integrity of the targeted cameras that would in turn render these 
cameras ineffective in fulfilling the intended security functions. 
There is a significant measure of research work in detection 
mechanisms of cyber-attacks against these Cyber Physical 
devices, however it is understudied area with such mechanisms 
against integrity attacks on physical configuration. This research 
proposes the use of the novel use of deep learning algorithms to 
detect such physical attacks originating from cyber or physical 
spaces. Additionally, we proposed the novel use of deep learning-
based video frame interpolation for such detection that has 
comparatively better performance to other anomaly detectors in 
spatiotemporal environments.   
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1. Introduction 
Surveillance cameras are an integral part of the smart 
infrastructure to provide security video surveillance to monitor 
and record areas of interest. Surveillance cameras are typically 
deployed in public areas like shopping malls, roadways, 
transportation hubs and also transportation platforms like 
trains. These surveillance cameras are operated by their human 
operators, processed by video analytics tools to detect activity 
or object of interest and videos are stored into video storage 
medium for later retrieval for post incident analysis like 
incident investigation or digital forensics. For such video 
surveillance to support their intended usages, the integrity of 
physical configuration of these surveillance cameras needs to 
be upkept and prevent any unauthorized changes. 
Configurations like the camera’s position or placement, Pan-
Tilt-Zoom (PTZ) configuration and their ability to maintain the 
line-of-sight of the area of surveillance.   
There are however threats and vulnerabilities to these 
surveillance camera’s physical configuration. Such malicious 
attack may occur in cyber or physical realms. Cyber induced 
form of attacks would first exploit the software vulnerability 
of the targeted camera and consequentially cause adversarial 
digitally-enabled alteration of the physical configuration. 
Physical tampering of cameras could be the simpler or less 
technically complex forms of attack that only requires the 
attacker to have physical reach to the camera to effect change 
to the configuration [17]. The effects of such physical 
tampering could result in the disruption of video stream or 
corrupt surveillance coverage. Conventional forms of 
detection mechanism of physical alteration would require 
human operators to manually study or observe video feeds. 
When there are large numbers of surveillance cameras 
involved, such monitoring efforts are inefficient and 
ineffective. Site inspections of camera deployments would be 
labour intensive and have long lead-time to detect such 
occurrences. 
This research proposes two novelties. The first is the 
application of Artificial Intelligence based Deep Learning 
algorithms to detect anomalous tampering of the physical 
configuration of surveillance cameras. The second is the 
proposition of a novel approach to video anomaly detection 
using video frame interpolation applied to spatiotemporal 
video feeds. Unlike most video anomaly detector, this is not 
based on visual optics flow. With this technique, it would 
provide an out-of-band visual layer approach to detect physical 
tampering of surveillance camera as a human operator could 
on video stream that is susceptible to varying degree of 
environmental changes within the surveillance area.  
ã 2019 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from 
IEEE must be obtained for all other users for all other uses, in any current 
or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for 
advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for 
resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted 
component of this work in other works. 
  
The next section of this paper provides background 
information about the forms of Cyber Physical attacks against 
surveillance and video frame interpolation. This is followed by 
related research work in detecting such form of attack and the 
popular types of deep learning video anomaly detectors. The 
description of the model is covered, followed by description of 
experiments and analysis done. The paper concludes with a 
conclusion and discussion about future research directions.     
2. Background Information 
2.1. Cyber Physical Attacks Against Surveillance Cameras  
The physical dimension of surveillance cameras is a 
prime candidate for an attack vector. Such physical attacks 
would include tampering of the cameras’ physical 
configuration like changing of the cameras’ position, adjusting 
the PTZ, blocking the cameras’ line of sight or fiddling with 
the cameras’ lens focal or zoom settings. These cameras could 
easily be physically damaged that would totally disrupt the 
video feeds. They could also be at risks of environmental based 
disruption attack to the dependent power supply, 
communication links or physical mountings used with these 
cameras [11]. While there are physical tamper protection 
solutions available, there are limits to such physics-based 
protection and less so for detection capabilities. However, such 
tampering could easily be detected by an observant human 
operator.  
Surveillance cameras, like all Internet of Things (IoT) 
devices, are also at risk to a wide range of cyber threats. As 
these IoT devices connect digitally to provide video feeds and 
receive administrative control commands, they are also 
vulnerable to cyber-attacks that could have physical 
consequences. Unauthorized privileged remote access to these 
surveillance cameras could alter the configuration of the 
vulnerable cameras preventing them from performing their 
intended surveillance functions or coverage [10]. Such forms 
of Cyber Physical attacks [15] originating primarily in cyber 
dimensions with physical consequence is likened to the 
Stuxnet malware attack that altered the physical operations of 
the targeted uranium enrichment facility. 
With the varied forms of cyber, physical or combined 
forms of attacks that could affect the configuration integrity of 
these IoT cameras, there are limits to detect such occurrence to 
prevent or recover from such attacks. The cyber detection 
mechanisms like Intrusion Detection System (IDS) would be 
effective against cyber-attacks; however, they are less capable 
of detecting physical attacks. Conversely physical attacks 
could cause significant cyber consequential impact to the 
intended digital operations of these IoT cameras. An approach 
to detect cyber physical attack variants would be to have an 
operator manually study the video feeds and identify any 
observable unintended changes to the video feeds. Hence this 
preliminary research work attempts to automate human’s 
abilities to analyze video feeds for any observable unintended 
changes induced by physical alterations while ignoring normal 
contextual environmental changes.  
2.2. Video Frame Interpolation  
Interpolation, within the mathematical field of numerical 
analysis, involves the approximated proposition of missing 
data points from a range of known data points. It has been used 
generate high resolution images from low resolution images 
[12]. Video frame interpolation involves the synthesis of 
nonexistent frames in-between the frames. It is typically used 
in rendering, compression and increasing video quality as part 
of computer vision and digital image processing. A 
conventional approach for frame generation is to use motion 
estimation-based methods that entails the computation of 
missing frames through the estimation of optical flows [14] or 
moving gradient techniques [13]. There are significant 
interests in applying deep convolutional neural networks to 
video frame interpolation. Mathieu et al. [7] used Mean 
Squared Error (MSE) as its loss function and multi-scale 
architecture to sharpen video frames. Liu et al [21] adopted 
optical flow-based networks to synthesis new video frames. 
However, there is none applied in the context of anomaly 
detection. Hence our research novelty is the application of 
Deep Learning based Video Frame Interpolation as an 
anomaly detector. 
3. Related Work 
3.1. Physical Integrity Tampering Detection 
Giraldo et al. [1] surveyed the research trends in 
developing detection solutions to detect varied forms of 
‘physics-based’ attacks against Cyber Physical Systems. They 
observed many forms of attacks against the ‘Trust’ factor or 
the integrity of physical components of Cyber Physical 
Systems would likely have observable attack effects. However, 
the problem is that such attack induced deviation effects may 
not be monitored hence detection alarms would not be raised.  
Valente and Cardenas [4] proposed the use visual 
challenges like QR codes to verify the freshness of camera 
video footage. The intent is to detect forms of adversarial video 
attacks that included moving cameras to point to different area. 
However, this detection solution would detect anomalies as 
long as the visual challenge remain visible to the camera. 
Zhang et al. [3] also observed that the physical environmental 
conditions are typically unique to the IoT’s deployment hence 
  
they are diverse. Hence any detection solution would need to 
be contextually tuned to the environment to minimize false 
alarms yet optimally sensitive to detect environmental 
integrity attacks. They also concluded that the study of dealing 
with threats originating from physical environment is 
understudied. This research work addresses the need to have a 
contextually tuned detector and contributed to this 
understudied area.  
3.2. Deep Learning based Anomaly Detectors 
Deep Learning algorithms have been very popular lately 
in their application to anomaly or fault detection. This is due 
to their ability to learn features (including video feeds) from 
raw data with their deep architectures compromising of layers 
of non-linear data processing units called neural networks. 
There are a variety of Deep Learning based methods used for 
such detection [9]. According to Ravi et al., they are broadly 
classed into the following three. 
 
• Autoencoder for reconstruction that uses 
representational learning approach that models normal 
behavior of surveillance videos through linear and non-
linear transformations of image flows from video footages.  
• Predictive modeling like Convolutional Recurrent 
Neural Network models attempts to predict future video 
frames from current temporal spatial video frames based 
on conditional distribution 𝑃(𝑥$	|(𝑥$'(	, 𝑥$'*	, …𝑥$',	)). 
• Generative models like Variational Autoencoders (VAE) 
attempts to model the likelihood of normal video feeds 
through the inclusion of stochastic variations. 
 
Anomaly detection with these unsupervised algorithms 
are done through the measure of variation of the reconstructed 
and actual video frame pairs against defined threshold. 
4. Models 
4.1. Base Deep Learning Algorithm 
In our research, we applied the Convolutional Long-Short 
Term Memory (ConvLSTM) [16] as the base architecture for 
our anomaly detector for physical attacks against the Cyber 
Physical surveillance camera. The ConvLSTM extends the 
fully connected Long-Short Term Memory (LSTM) to include 
convolutional structures in both the input-to-state and state-to-
state transitions. With convolutional kernels, the ConvLSTM 
ingests the video frame images with higher dimensions of 
spatial temporal associations as inputs. The following are the 
mathematical expressions for the ConvLSTM. 
   
𝐼$ = 	 𝜎(𝑊23 ∗ 𝑋$ +𝑊73 ∗ 𝐻$'( +𝑊93 ∘ 𝐶$'( + 𝑏3) (1) 
 𝐹$ = 	𝜎(𝑊2> ∗ 𝑋$ +𝑊7> ∗ 𝐻$'( +𝑊9> ∘ 𝐶$'( + 𝑏>) (2) 
 𝐶$ = 	 𝑓$ ∘ 𝐶$'( + 𝑖3 ∘ tanh(𝑊29 + 𝑋$ +𝑊79 ∗ 𝐻$'( + 𝑏9) (3) 
 𝑂$ = 	𝜎(𝑊2F ∗ 𝑋$ +𝑊7F ∗ 𝐻$'( +𝑊9F ∘ 𝐶$'( + 𝑏F) (4) 
 𝐻$ = 	 𝑜$ ∘ tanh(𝑉$) (5) 
 
In comparison to LSTM, the ConvLSTM has ‘∗’ 
operators that performs convolution operation while ‘◦’ is the 
Hadamard product for the element-wise product of matrices. 
The rest of network structure performs, like the LSTM 
network, processes the input, forget, cell, output and hidden 
state computations for each timestep denoted by 𝐼,𝐹,𝐶,𝑂 and 𝐻 respectively with activation by 𝜎 and convolutional filter 
computation with the sets of weights, 𝑊 . Each state is 
represented as a matrix representing a video frame. 
ConvLSTM has been used extensively as the base architecture 
for video anomaly detection. 
4.2. Anomaly Detector Algorithms 
With the base ConvLSTM, we applied the popular three 
forms of anomaly detectors [9] namely Autoencoder [18], 
Predictive [19] and VAE [20] used as comparative models to 
our model. 
 
FIGURE 1. ConvLSTM Predictor   
Our model is similarly structured to the Predictive 
ConvLSTM [9] shown in Figure 1. The Predictive model takes 
in a sequence of video frames (𝑥$'J, 𝑥$'J'(	 , … , 𝑥$'(	,	𝑥$	 ), 
where 𝐽  is the length of the LSTM’s timestep, performs 
unsupervised feature extraction through an encoder which then 
feeds to a decoder that is trained to deconvolute and predict the 
next video frame (𝑥$L(	) through reconstructive approximation 
as illustrated mathematically below. 
 𝑥M$L( = 	 𝑝(𝑥$L(|𝑥$'J, 𝑥$'J'(,… 𝑥$'(, 𝑥$) 
(6) ≈ 	 𝑝(𝑥$L(|𝑓PQ9FR3QS(𝑥$'J, 𝑥$'J'(,…𝑥$'(, 𝑥$)) ≈ 𝑔3Q$PU,FVW$P(𝑓PQ9FR3QSX𝑥$'J, 𝑥$'J'(,… 𝑥$'(, 𝑥$Y) 
 
  
Our model, based on deep learning convolutional 
interpolation [8], involves approximating the interpolation of 
the missing video frame 𝜃$'([(𝑥, 𝑦) from the pair of adjacent 
video frames available 𝜃$'*(𝑥, 𝑦) and 𝜃$(𝑥, 𝑦). 
 
FIGURE 2. Video Frame Interpolation  
 
The encoding ConvLSTM network ingests the input 
sequence of video frames (𝑥$'J, 𝑥$'JL(,… , 𝑥$'*, 𝑥$ ) into its 
hidden layers of ConvLSTM with one video frame excluded 
(𝑥$'(	). The Interpolation ConvLSTM network will unfold the 
hidden state to reconstruct the missing video frame through 
interpolation. 
 
FIGURE 3. ConvLSTM Interpolator 
 𝑥M$'( = 	 𝑝(𝑥$'(|𝑥$'J, 𝑥$'J'(,… 𝑥$'*, 𝑥$) 
(7) ≈ 	 𝑝(𝑥$'(|𝑓PQ9FR3QS(𝑥$'J, 𝑥$'J'(,…𝑥$'*, 𝑥$)) ≈ 𝑔3Q$PU,FVW$P(𝑓PQ9FR3QSX𝑥$'J, 𝑥$'J'(,… 𝑥$'*, 𝑥$Y) 
 
 
We adopted the same Mean Square Error (MSE) loss 
function used by Mathieu et al. [7], in applying deep learning 
on video interpolation to solve blurriness in frame prediction, 
to train the interpolation model to reconstruct the missing 
frame. During inference, the model computes the interpolated 
missing video frame against the actual video frame that it is 
given using MSE where 𝜃]	is the inferred interpolated output, 
𝜃  is the actual value and 𝑝  is the total number of pixels 
contained in that frame.  𝑒 = 1𝑝` (𝜃]a3 − 𝜃a3)*,3c(  (8) 
 
A high MSE that exceeds a defined threshold between the 
two frames (computed interpolated reconstruct and the actual) 
indicates the notable change noted by the model hence 
indicating an anomalous occurrence. 
5. Methodology and Analysis 
5.1. Dataset 
For our video training data, we used two sets of video 
surveillance camera footages. Both sets are stationary train 
surveillance cameras with people moving through the train 
carriages with segments of video footage with passengers 
performing some atypical activities like hugging and fighting 
in a moving train with constantly changing environmental 
background observed through the window screens of the train 
carriages. Both surveillance camera datasets were captured as 
part of Eureka Celtic Initiative supported by four European 
countries [5] focused on improving train passenger security 
video analytics. Two cameras datasets are cameras from 
different locations as shown below.  
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4. Surveillance Cameras on Moving Train  
 
We trained all models to tune them to learn the 
spatiotemporal features of both environments. We also created 
a sets of test videos from both cameras that simulated physical 
attacks. The training dataset accounted about 90% of the video 
footage and 10% for testing dataset. The simulated attacks 
took the following forms of attacks with ten randomly selected 
time instances for each attack hence having imbalance class 
distribution of normal video footages and video segments with 
  
attack effects. 
 
• Blocking camera’s view that simulated by masking out 
the video footage with a black image. This attack mimics 
a physical attack of covering the camera or perhaps 
physically making the camera’s capture lens opaque 
through application of water based paint.  
 
FIGURE 5. Rightmost video frame simulates blocked view  
 
• Adjusting the zoom configuration of the camera that 
was simulated by cropping specific video frames. This 
simulation simulates the attack of physically adjusting the 
zoom factor of the camera configuration hence causing the 
camera to limit its viewing angle and obscuring parts of 
the intended surveillance coverage. 
 
FIGURE 6. Rightmost video frame simulates zoom-in  
 
• Altering the focus of the camera that was simulated by 
applying image filters (blurring) to specific video frames. 
The simulation seeks to mimic the physical manual 
adjustments of focal lens of the camera hence affecting the 
clarity of the captured video feed. 
 
FIGURE 7. Rightmost video frame simulates blurring effect  
 
• Adjusting the camera’s viewing angle that was 
simulated by shifting the viewing area of the recorded 
video footage. This attack simulates a physical left tilt of 
the camera position. The effects of the change of viewing 
area could obscure area of the view that may be important 
to closely monitor.  
 
FIGURE 8. Rightmost video frame simulates small left-shift  
 
5.2. Results and Analysis 
All models were trained and tested with the four sets of 
test scenarios. An evaluation criterion based on True Positive, 
True Negative, False Positive, False Negatives were collected. 
Additionally, the F1, Precision and Recall values were 
computed. Hence a total of 32 test evaluation results were 
collected with the four test scenarios with two sets of 
previously unseen camera videos across four models including 
our interpolation anomaly detector model. The following are 
the results summarized and organized by the four test scenarios. 
TABLE 1. Blocking Camera’s View 
Model 
Evaluation  
TP/TN/FP/FN F1 Precision Recall 
Predictor 20/7828/5/0 0.89 0.80 1.00 
Interpolator 20/7832/1/0 0.98 0.95 1.00 
VAE 20/7822/11/0 0.78 0.65 1.00 
AE 0/7833/0/20 N/A N/A 0.00 
TABLE 2. Adjust Camera’s Zoom 
Model 
Evaluation  
TP/TN/FP/FN F1 Precision Recall 
Predictor 20/7828/5/0 0.89 0.80 1.00 
Interpolator 20/7832/1/0 0.98 0.95 1.00 
VAE 20/7821/12/0 0.77 0.63 1.00 
AE 4/7833/0/16 0.33 1.00 0.20 
TABLE 3. Alter Camera’s Focus 
Model 
Evaluation  
TP/TN/FP/FN F1 Precision Recall 
Predictor 18/7828/5/2 0.84 0.78 0.90 
Interpolator 10/7826/7/10 0.54 0.59 0.50 
VAE 3/7821/12/17 0.17 0.20 0.15 
  
Model 
Evaluation  
TP/TN/FP/FN F1 Precision Recall 
AE 0/7833/0/20 N/A N/A 0.00 
TABLE 4. Shift Camera – Camera 1 
Model 
Evaluation  
TP/TN/FP/FN F1 Precision Recall 
Predictor 19/7826/7/1 0.83 0.73 0.95 
Interpolator 19/7831/2/1 0.93 0.90 0.95 
VAE 10/7822/11/10 0.49 0.48 0.50 
AE 0/7831/2/20 N/A 0.00 0.00 
 
The test results indicate that the anomaly detector with 
video frame interpolation performed the best compared to the 
other models for physical attacks for three out of the four test 
scenarios. It was second best for the simulated tests of 
adjusting the camera’s focus. 
As part of testing, we rendered the interpolated video 
frame of our our ConvLSTM Interpolator model to study the 
reconstructed video frame. We compared the interpolated 
video frames when there were nobody present in the train 
carriage and where there was.  
 
FIGURE 9. Reconstructed video frame by our ConvLSTM Interpolator 
when the train carriage is empty (left) and has passengers (right) 
 
Notably the left images of the reconstructed video frames 
has a definitive image representation of the environmental 
settings of the train carriage. Where there are image segments 
in the video frame that may contain transient objects like 
moving or seated passengers present in the surveillance 
footage, the model would generate a silhouette form of those 
objects. It is apparent that our model ConvLSTM Interpolator 
has tuned itself to environmental settings of the surveillance 
coverage. 
6. Conclusion and Future Directions 
Surveillance cameras are at risks of physical integrity 
attacks and it is an understudied area. There is serious 
functional surveillance impact from attacks on the physical 
configurations of these surveillance cameras that could 
originate from cyber or physical spaces. When such attack 
occurs and remains undetected, the video recordings of the 
attacked cameras could be rendered useless when they are 
analyzed for investigative purposes or digital video forensics.  
This research work demonstrates the application of deep 
learning algorithms to perform visual layer inspection or 
monitoring of surveillance video feeds to spot any observable 
forms of surveillance coverage integrity attacks. Additionally, 
this work further extends the typical classes of deep learning 
based anomaly detection algorithms to include a novel form 
using video frame interpolation.  
Future research work will involve applying the detection 
approach to actual surveillance camera feeds to detect real  
attacks. Also, to apply it on archived video recordings to detect 
any past physical tampering or attack occurrences. Finally, to 
extend the application of interpolation based anomaly 
detection to other domains beyond visual anomalies.   
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